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I. INTRODUCTION
In late 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in TC Heartland,
LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC,1 a case addressing the
interpretation of the special patent venue and the general venue statutes.
The case was brought by Heartland, a sweetener manufacturer organized
as a limited liability company under Indiana law and headquartered in
Indiana.2 In 2014, Kraft sued Heartland for infringement of three patents
on liquid water enhancers. Although Kraft is headquartered in Illinois, the
lawsuit was brought in the District of Delaware, where Heartland is not
registered to do business and does not have a regular or established place
*
Jaharis Faculty Fellow in Health Law and Intellectual Property, DePaul University
College of Law. For helpful comments, I would like to thank Mark Moller and Josh
Sarnoff. All errors remain my own.
1
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Grp., 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 137 S.Ct. 614 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2016) (No. 16-341).
2
Brief for Petitioner at 16-17, TC Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC,
No. 16-341 (Jan. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Petitioner Brief].
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of business.3 However, in 2013, some of Heartland’s accused products
(representing approximately 2% of Heartland’s annual sales) were dropshipped to locations in Delaware at the request of an Arkansas-based
customer.4 The court deemed this link sufficient to trigger personal
jurisdiction in the patent lawsuit brought by Kraft.
A thinly construed nexus—chiefly through the sale of goods—is not
uncommon in establishing personal jurisdiction for corporations in
general,5 and in patent infringement cases in particular. For the past quarter
of a century, the Federal Circuit has interpreted the patent venue statute6
permissively, enabling patentees to bring a lawsuit against a corporation
in any district where personal jurisdiction arises.7 In the case of national
companies like Heartland, this permissive approach allows patent
infringement lawsuits to be brought anywhere in the United States where
a modicum of sales may occur.8
From a venue perspective, what sets patent infringement cases apart
are the idiosyncrasies of forum shopping and forum selling created by
permissive constructions of the patent venue statute. Among these
idiosyncrasies, most notably, is the overwhelming volume of patent
infringement cases being filed in the anomalous rural Eastern District of
Texas.9 TC Heartland, now before the Supreme Court, provides an
opportunity to alter this scenario.10
In 2015, Heartland petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of
mandamus directing the Delaware trial court to dismiss the Kraft lawsuit
for lack of personal jurisdiction, or transfer the case to the Southern
District of Indiana due to improper venue.11 After the Federal Circuit
denied the mandamus petition, Heartland filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari in September 2016, which the Supreme Court granted in
December.12 If the Supreme Court rules in favor of Heartland, patent
venue will be interpreted independently from the general venue statute,
Petitioner Brief, at 16-17.
Petitioner Brief, at 18.
5
See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (articulating the
requirement of minimum contacts for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
corporation); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
6
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012).
7
See infra, note 35-41 and accompanying text.
8
See infra, section I.B Effects of Permissive Patent Venue.
9
See infra, note 42-47 and accompanying text.
10
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Grp., 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 137 S.Ct. 614 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2016) (No. 16-341).
11
Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In re TC Heartland, LLC, No. 16-105 (Fed. Cir. Oct.
23, 2015), ECF No. 2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2012) (authorizing transfer of a case
when venue is improper).
12
TC Heartland, 821 F.3d at 1338.
3
4
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which will result in a narrower construction of venue in patent
infringement cases.13 This, in turn, will likely lead to less patentee forumshopping as well as a redistribution of patent litigation across the
country.14
This Article explores the implications of the upcoming Supreme Court
decision in TC Heartland v. Kraft. In Part II, this Article addresses the
legislative history and interpretation of the patent venue statute by the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, as well as the effects that the
Federal Circuit’s permissive constructions of venue have had on patent
litigation over the past 27 years. Part III looks at possible outcomes after
the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland v. Kraft: it starts by
discussing patterns of patent litigation redistribution in the event of a
decision for Heartland, and then turns to alternative channels for achieving
patent venue reform, should the Court side with Kraft. Finally, this Article
concludes by positioning the outcome of the case into the larger ongoing
debate surrounding patent exceptionalism.

II.

EVOLUTION OF PATENT VENUE

A. Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation of Patent Venue
Federal courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over patent
infringement cases.15 For a plaintiff to successfully initiate a lawsuit, the
court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant,16 and venue must
be proper. In patent cases, the latter is governed by a special venue
statute,17 first enacted in 1897.18 From 1789 to 1897, patent venue was
governed by the general venue statute.19 Under the general statute and
successive amendments,20 plaintiffs started bringing patent infringement
lawsuits in almost anywhere in the Union.21 Congress intervened in 1897,
See infra, note 78-82 and accompanying text.
See infra, note 78-89 and accompanying text.
15
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
16
See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012).
18
Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695.
19
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (1897) (limiting lawsuits to places where
the defendant “is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found”).
20
See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552.
21
Plaintiffs in patent infringement cases took advantage of the fact that diversity
lawsuits could now be brought in the place of residence of either the plaintiff or defendant.
See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, at 552-53; see also Richard C. Wydick,
Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25 STAN. L. REV. 551, 553 (1973) (describing
how the broad general venue statute led to situations of abuse beyond the sphere of patent
lawsuits).
13
14
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enacting a separate patent venue statute that limited venue22 to two
situations: 1) the place where the defendant inhabited; or 2) the place
where the defendant committed infringing acts and had a place of
business.23
Until the mid-twentieth century, the special statute applicable to patent
venue remained fairly isolated from the legislative and interpretive
changes affecting the general venue statute. In the 1942 Stonite Products
case, the Supreme Court confirmed that the 1897 patent statute alone
governed venue in patent infringement cases.24 Six years later, however,
as the Judicial Code was revised, Congress made textual changes that
would affect venue.25 Instead of limiting patent venue to the place where
the defendant “inhabits”—per the 1897 text—the 1948 revisions
introduced the word “resides.”26 In its entirety, the newly codified section
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) states “[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may
be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and
established place of business.”27 The text remains unchanged to this day.
The general venue statute also underwent changes 1948 when it was
revised and codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1391.28 In setting forth the residence
criteria for purposes of general venue, Congress established in § 1391(c)
that a corporate defendant could be sued in its place of incorporation or
place of business, and that either locus would constitute corporate
residence for venue purposes.29 The general standard was thus broader
than the patent venue standard, a phenomenon that once again prompted
questions about the relationship between special and general venue.
The Supreme Court addressed these questions in 1957 in the Fourco
Glass case, reaffirming the idea that there was no interplay between the
two statutes.30 Section 1400(b) remained a special statute governing

See Wydick, supra note 21, at 554-56.
Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695
24
Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 565, n.5, 566 (1942)
(“Congress did not intend the Act of 1897 to dovetail with the general provisions relating
to the venue of civil suits, but rather that it alone should control venue in patent
infringement proceedings.”)
25
See generally Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial
Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 234-40 (1948).
26
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012) (“Words in subsection (b) ‘where the defendant resides’
were substituted for ‘of which the defendant is an inhabitant.’”).
27
Id.
28
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1948).
29
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2012) (“A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in
which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial
district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.”).
30
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
22
23
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patents and, therefore, its scope had not been broadened by changes to
general venue.31 Under Fourco Glass, substituting “inhabits” with
“resides” had no meaningful effect.
In 1988, Congress amended general venue again.32 For corporate
defendants, § 1391(c) now equated venue with personal jurisdiction:33
For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that
is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial
district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the
time the action is commenced.34
For parties in patent infringement lawsuits, the most relevant change
introduced by the 1988 amendment to the general venue statute was,
however, the inclusion of the words “under this chapter.” Because
§ 1400(b) falls under the same chapter as § 1391(c), in 1990, the Federal
Circuit held in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. that the
amended § 1391(c) governed patent venue as well.35 This meant that
corporate residence attached to any place where there was personal
jurisdiction, instead of only to the place of incorporation.36 VE Holding
thus ushered in an era of permissible patent venue and opened the door for
extensive forum shopping in patent infringement cases, as described in the
following section.37

Id. at 228 (“We think it is clear that § 1391(c) is a general corporation venue statute,
whereas § 1400(b) is a special venue statute applicable, specifically, to all defendants in a
particular type of actions, i.e., patent infringement actions.”).
32
See generally Thomas W. Adams, The 1988 Revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(C):
Corporate Venue Is Now Equivalent to In Personam Jurisdiction Effects on Civil Actions
for Patent Infringement, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 357 (1991).
33
Id. at 363-65.
34
Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1013(a)-(b), 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c)).
35
VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
36
Id. (“[V]enue in a patent infringement case includes any district where there would be
personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant at the time the action is commenced.
While this test is narrower than allowing venue wherever a corporate defendant could be
served, it is somewhat broader than that encompassed by the previous standard of ‘place
of incorporation.’’)
37
See infra, note 47-55 and accompanying text. See also Kimberly A. Moore, Forum
Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation, 79 N.C. L. REV.
889, 897 (2001) (discussing how VE Holding “rendered superfluous the patent venue
statute for corporate defendants” and enabled widespread forum-shopping among
patentees).
31
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General venue was last amended in 2011. Among other changes,38
Congress replaced “under this chapter” with “for all venue purposes.”39
This change did not substantially affect the VE Holding-enabled
permissive approach to patent venue.

B. Effects of Permissive Patent Venue
Permissive venue allows plaintiffs in patent infringement cases to
engage in a particularly lenient form of forum shopping, as patentees have
been able to sue in practically any federal court of their choosing for nearly
three decades.40 Forum shopping in patent litigation predated the 19881990 changes that broadened patent venue.41 In fact, forum shopping was
one of the concerns that led to the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.42
Having jurisdiction that extends beyond patent appeals,43 the Federal
Circuit contributed to what is often called “patent exceptionalism”44 at
both substantive and (especially) procedural levels. But creation of a
specialized appellate circuit for patent cases did not minimize the forum
shopping problem,45 which assumed new contours after the Supreme
Court ruling in VE Holding.

See Pub. L. No. 112-63, § 202, 125 Stat. 758 (2011) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(a)) (establishing that general venue now governs “all civil actions brought in district
courts of the United States”); id. at § 202 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2))
(establishing that the merging of venue and personal jurisdiction is no longer limited to
corporations).
39
Id. at § 202 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)).
40
See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1451 (2010).
41
See supra, note 32-35 and accompanying text; see also VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson
Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
42
See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Comm’n on Revision of the Fed.
Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change
(1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195; see also J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for
Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 633, n.6 (2015); see generally Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(1989).
43
28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012); see LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS (2011);
Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal
Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12 (2009) (describing how multiple-goal institutions
tend to underperform in “goals that are hard to measure”); see also R. Polk Wagner & Lee
Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial
Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004) (discussing overall performance of the
Federal Circuit in patent and non-patent cases).
44
See infra, note 100 and accompanying text.
45
See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 892 (2001) (providing data that shows that this
occurs before and after the creation of the Federal Circuit).
38
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Empirical research has shown that the distribution of patent cases
among the ninety-four judicial districts is so uneven that it cannot possibly
be attributable to the relative size of civil dockets.46 In 2015, 44% of all
5,830 patent cases filed in the United States were brought in the Eastern
District of Texas, with the District of Delaware a distant second (9%),
followed by the Central and North Districts of California (with 5% and
4%, respectively).47
The popularity of Texas—and of the predominantly rural Eastern
District in particular—cannot be explained by geographical clustering of
patent-intensive industries, as major technology hubs are located
elsewhere as well.48 What, in fact, explains the anomalous rates of patent
cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas is the patentee-friendly
reputation of the district, attracting litigation through favorable procedural
and administrative practices in patent cases.49 As corporate venue was
interpreted to expand nationally, Texas became the preferred target for
patent forum shopping.50 With forum shopping in patent cases on the rise
since the early 1990s,51 the Eastern District of Texas went from a total of
14 patent cases in 1999 to nearly 200 patent cases a year by the mid2000s;52 in 2012 that number skyrocketed to 1,247, while in 2015 it more
than doubled to a grand total of 2,540.53 Between 2007 and the first half
of 2016, the Eastern District of Texas attracted 20% of national patent
litigation, followed by Delaware (12%) and the Central District of
California (8%).54
Among the practices that propelled the Eastern District of Texas to
forum shopping prominence, scholars identified several factors that set the

Id.
See Colleen V. Chien & Michael Risch, Recalibrating Patent Venue, 77 MD. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 13) (Santa Clara Univ., Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 10-1). Early data for 2017 show the rate for the Eastern District of Texas at 35%. See
Brief of 22 Law, Economics and Business Professors as Amici Curiae in support of
Respondent (Mar. 8, 2017), at 3 (quoting from Docket Navigator Analytics, New Patent
Cases, https://www.docketnavigator.com/stats).
48
See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631,
632-33 (2015) (noting that neither Texas nor Delaware are “home to a major technology
industry”).
49
Id. at 634.
50
See generally Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical
Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas As a Preeminent Forum for
Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J. L. & TECH. 193 (2007).
51
Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 901 (2001).
52
See Chien & Risch, supra note 47, at 12.
53
Id.
54
Id.
46
47
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district apart.55 One of the most relevant is the Eastern District of Texas’s
hostility to summary judgment,56 which traditionally favors defendants in
patent lawsuits.57 As patent cases go to trial more often in Eastern Texas
than elsewhere in the country, patentees also encounter more sympathetic
juries; plaintiffs win 72% of jury trials in this district, as opposed to the
national average of 61%.58 The district has also historically resisted the
transfer of patent cases.59 Between 1991 and 2010, transfer motions had a
34.5% success rate in the Eastern District of Texas, well below the 50%
average in districts with long-established patent litigation.60
In addition to a generally more favorable litigation atmosphere, in the
Eastern District of Texas there is the possibility for plaintiffs to learn in
advance the identity of the judge assigned to their case—a feature that has
been described as “judge-shopping.”61 This happened in the wake of the
implementation of the Patent Pilot Program in 2011.62 The Program was
designed to increase patent expertise among federal judges63 by allowing
reassignment of patent cases to “designated judges”—judges who
volunteered to receive patent cases from non-program judges in the same
district, or to receive randomly assigned patent cases.64 For participating
districts, the probability of a specific judge being assigned to a patent case
is less than one-third.65 The Eastern District of Texas, however,
implemented the program in the way that greatly increases these odds:
In contrast to the random assignment norm, the Eastern
District of Texas assigns cases based on the division in
which they were filed and, more importantly, specifies ex
In addition to hostility to summary judgment and transfer, “judge-shopping” and
quick scheduling, described in this section, Klerman & Reilly have identified additional
areas setting the Eastern District of Texas apart as pro-plaintiff: loose interpretation of
joinder rules; pro-plaintiff management of multi-Defendant cases; refusal to stay pending
reexaminations; adoption of procedural rules that speed up discovery. Daniel Klerman &
Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 99 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 257-70 (2016).
56
See id. at 251-52 (noting that going to trial usually bolsters the plaintiff’s chances of
winning a case).
57
See id. at 251 (quoting John Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern
Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1787-90 (2014)).
58
See id. at 254 (quoting Allison et al., supra note 57, at 1793-94).
59
Id. at 260-63.
60
See Andrei Iancu & Jay Chung, Real Reasons the Eastern District of Texas Draws
Patent Cases—Beyond Lore and Anecdote, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 315 (2011).
61
Klerman & Reilly, supra note 55, at 251.
62
Patent Cases Pilot Program, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 137).
63
See generally MARGARET S. WILLIAMS ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATENT PILOT
PROGRAM: FIVE-YEAR REPORT (Apr. 2016).
64
Id. at 2.
65
Klerman & Reilly, supra note 55, at 254-57.
55
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ante via a public order the allocation of cases filed in each
division. For example, in 2006 at the outset of the Eastern
District’s popularity, patentees filing in the Marshall
division were told they had a 70% chance of being
assigned to Judge Ward, those filing in Tyler a 60%
chance of Judge Davis, those filing in Sherman a 65%
chance of Judge Schell, and those filing in Texarkana a
90% chance of Judge Folsom.66
In addition to the aforementioned factors, the Eastern District of Texas
also boasts a reputation for swiftness, having one of the fastest patent
dockets in the country.67 Median time to trial was 1.8 years during the early
to mid-2000s, an average that increased to 2.3 years between 2008 and
2015 as the patent caseload ballooned.68
The convergence of these pro-plaintiff factors has thereby made the
Eastern District of Texas the preferred forum for patentees. To be sure,
forum shopping is not specific to patent litigation and the case of the
Eastern District presents extreme characteristics. But it is a case where the
outcomes disproportionately impact patent law, both procedurally and
substantively. Jeanne Fromer, building on then professor and now Federal
Circuit judge Kimberly Moore’s empirical work, summarized the
detrimental effects of forum shopping associated with patent litigation:69
1) patentees are more likely to win a case for procedural reasons (e.g.
transfer of a motion) than through application of substantive patent law, a
phenomenon that impacts both the “normative force” of patent law and
patent policy as a whole;70 2) the legal system is manipulated by plaintiffs,
bringing into question fundamental notions of justice;71 and 3) significant
resources are consumed by litigation on forum choice instead of (or before
getting to) substantive issues, impacting economic efficiency.72
Patent forum shopping, while unavoidable to some extent, is
ultimately undesirable at the scale reached in the Eastern District of Texas.
As permissive patent venue greatly enabled forum shopping among
patentees, the impending Supreme Court decision in TC Heartland v. Kraft
has the potential to change the landscape in patent infringement litigation.
This is not to say that, if the Court sides with Heartland, patent forum
Id.
Id. at 21-22.
68
Id.
69
See Fromer, supra note 40, 1464-65; but see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507 (1995)
(weighing the potential benefits and costs of forum-shopping).
70
Fromer, supra note 40, at 1464-65.
71
Id. at 1465; see also Anderson, supra note 48, at 637.
72
Fromer, supra note 40, at 1464-65.
66
67
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shopping would end.73 But litigation would drift away from fora like
Eastern Texas and, in this sense, would align patent venue patterns with
those observed under general venue rules.

III. OUTCOME OF TC HEARTLAND V. KRAFT
AND FORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES
A. Potential Impact of TC Heartland v. Kraft
The question presented in TC Heartland v. Kraft is “[w]hether 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in
patent infringement actions and is not to be supplemented by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c).”74 Contrary to the position embraced by the Federal Circuit in
VE Holding,75 Heartland argues that the two provisions should not be read
together.76 Should this view prevail, the Supreme Court would essentially
exhume its own 1957 Fourco Glass decision and overturn the Federal
Circuit; § 1400(b) would once again govern patent venue alone, without
§ 1391(c) broadening the definition of residence.77 Consequently, a
Supreme Court reversal of the Federal Circuit means that § 1391(c)
(general venue) would no longer expand § 1400(b) (patent venue) to
include any district where a corporation might have minimum contacts.
Instead, patent venue for corporations would only be proper in one of two
scenarios: 1) place of residence (i.e. incorporation) of the defendant; or (2)
place where the defendant committed infringing acts and maintains a
regular place of business.78
Under the scenario in which plaintiffs have a more limited choice of
fora in which to sue for patent infringement, there would be significant
redistribution of patent cases across districts. Even before TC Heartland
v. Kraft made its way to the Supreme Court, there was a consensus that a
more restrictive approach to patent venue would lead to geographical
clustering of patent litigation based on types of technology.79 Already in
2010, Jeanne Fromer predicted that, if patent venue were restricted to the
principal place of business of a corporation, “pharmaceutical suits w[ould]
likely cluster in the District of New Jersey, and software patent suits

73
74
75
76
77
78
79

See infra, note 90-92 and accompanying text.
Petitioner Brief, supra note 2, at i.
See supra note 35-41 and accompanying text.
Petitioner Brief, supra note 2, at 20.
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 223-224 (1957).
Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695.
See Fromer, supra note 40, at 1447.
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w[ould] likely group themselves in the Northern District of California, the
District of Massachusetts, and the Western District of Washington.”80
This approach would still translate into a limited number of courts
deciding a high number of technology-specific patent cases.81 It would,
however, exclude clustering in districts with no sizeable patent-driven
industries and eliminate incentives for courts to compete for patent cases
in these geographical areas.
Recent empirical research maps out further implications of a potential
win by Heartland.82 Looking at data from 2015 as a comparison point, if
the Supreme Court’s decision were to lead to a restriction of patent venue,
52% of corporations would be forced to choose a different district in which
to sue for patent infringement.83 Overall, smaller defendants would benefit
the most from a restrictive approach to venue, as the combination of
regular place of business and districts where infringing acts occur—the
only venue-triggering mechanism in addition to place of incorporation—
would likely span across more limited geographical areas.84 In fact,
predictions show that nearly half of defendants (46%) would be sued in
their principal place of business.85
Empirical models also show that the type of technology around which
companies cluster would play a role in the aftermath of a reversal of the
Federal Circuit in TC Heartland v. Kraft. “TC Heartland would provide
venue relief to over 50% of the defendants in all major sectors except
finance and biopharma. The defendant industries that would experience
the greatest relief, as measured by the proportion of migrating cases, under
TC Heartland would be services, finance and tech.”86
Predictably, the face of this patent litigation redistribution would be
the Eastern District of Texas. Patent caseload in the District would drop
from the 2015 high of 44% to 14.7%.87 Still, with reference to 2015
numbers, the District of Delaware would climb from 9% to 23.8%.88 The
Northern District of California would also see a significant increase, from
4% to 13%, while the Central District of California (5% to 6.1%) and the
Id.
Id. at 1147-148 (stating that proponents of generalist courts (as opposed to specialized
patent courts) argue that industry concentration would eventually lead to a natural
specialization of judges and juries in these areas); see generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A.
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009).
82
See Chien & Risch, supra note 47.
83
Id. at 34.
84
Chien & Risch, supra note 47, at 41 (noting that smaller defendants would benefit the
most from venue relief because they have “relatively smaller footprints”).
85
Id. at 35.
86
Id. at 43.
87
Id. at 37.
88
Id.
80
81
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District of New Jersey (5% to 5.3%) would experience less perceptible
changes in patent litigation volume.89
The following section situates these potential shifts in the context of
the broader discussion of patent cases as outliers in the judicial system. It
should be noted, however, that giving special treatment to patent venue—
as opposed to broadening it through general venue—has the effect of
bringing patent litigation into consonance with patterns observed in nonpatent litigation in general, where courts in the District of Delaware play
a preponderant role.90 Although paradoxical, this is not necessarily an
undesirable effect; for example, as seen above, restrictive patent venue
would be protective of smaller defendants. Nevertheless, the possibility of
a reconfiguration of patent litigation across the United States raises several
policy questions that might have motivated the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari to TC Heartland v. Kraft.

B. Patent Venue Exceptionalism in the Aftermath of
TC Heartland v. Kraft
Patent venue reform does not depend exclusively on the Supreme
Court ruling in favor of Heartland in the upcoming decision of TC
Heartland v. Kraft. In fact, there have been multiple proposals to address
this issue through legislative approaches.91The most recent attempt at
reforming patent venue dates to March 2016, when the Venue Equity and
Non-Uniformity Elimination Act (“VENUE Act”) was introduced in
Congress.92 The proposed bill would require that:
Any civil action for patent infringement or any action for
a declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid or not
infringed ( . . . ) be brought only in a judicial district
(1) where the defendant has its principal place of
business or is incorporated;
(2) where the defendant has committed an act of
infringement of a patent in suit and has a regular and

Id.
See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 55 (describing Delaware as a “magnet jurisdiction”
for bankruptcy cases.).
91
See generally Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s “Renegade District”: Lessons for
Patent Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111, 141, 145-151 (2008) (providing an account of
attempts to reform patent venue through legislative action up to 2008).
92
Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S.2733, 114th Cong.
(2016) [hereinafter VENUE Act].
89
90
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established physical facility that gives rise to the act
of infringement;
(3) where the defendant has agreed or consented to be
sued in the instant action;
(4) where an inventor named on the patent in suit
conducted research or development that led to the
application for the patent in suit;
(5) where a party has a regular and established
physical facility that such party controls and operates,
not primarily for the purpose of creating venue, and
has—
(A) engaged in management of significant
research and development of an invention
claimed in a patent in suit prior to the effective
filing date of the patent;
(B) manufactured a tangible product that is
alleged to embody an invention claimed in a
patent in suit; or
(C) implemented a manufacturing process for a
tangible good in which the process is alleged to
embody an invention claimed in a patent in suit;
or
(6) in the case of a foreign defendant that does not
meet the requirements of paragraph (1) or (2), in
accordance with section 1391(c)(3).93
For the past year, the VENUE Act has lingered in the Senate Judiciary
Committee,94 from which it may not emerge,95 especially if the holding in
VENUE Act, Sec. 2(b).
Actions Overview: S.2733—114th Congress (2015-2016), LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2733/actions (last visited Mar.
3, 2017).
95
It has been reported that the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee has chosen
not to support the VENUE Act in favor of pursuing legislative options offering larger scale
changes to patent law and policy. See Michael Rosen, Another Patent Reform Bill Just Died
in Congress, TECHPOLICYDAILY.COM (May 19, 2016, 6:00 A.M.), http://www.techpolicy
daily.com/technology/another-patent-reform-bill-just-died-congress/ (last visited Mar. 3,
2017) (quoting Kate Tummarello & Alex Byers, Zuckerberg: Facebook Wants to Meet
With Conservatives, POLITICO (May 13, 2016, 10:09 AM), http://www.politico.com/tipshe
93
94
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TC Heartland v. Kraft results in a narrowing of patent venue that would
significantly overlap with the scope of the bill.
In any event, even if the Supreme Court chooses not to overturn the
Federal Circuit on this issue, there appears to be sufficient momentum
behind patent venue reform to trigger a landscape change in the near
future. The fact that the Eastern District of Texas is now the poster child
for venue abuse beyond the legal and scholarly milieu, capturing popular
and political discourse has greatly advanced this cause.96 Whether venue
reform will come in the form of a Supreme Court decision that is favorable
to Heartland, through ad hoc legislative action, or bundled with broader
reforms of patent law, however, still remains to be seen.
Regardless of how it occurs, an upcoming reform is poised to break
the 27-year link between patent and general venue.97 As explained above,
shrinking patent venue would produce several desirable effects, curbing
forum shopping by patentees to a certain extent and shielding smaller
defendants from litigation in remote districts.98 Paradoxically, however,
allowing patent venue to once again be solely governed by a special venue
provision will reinscribe patent litigation into generic corporate litigation
trends—patentees will flock primarily to the reemerging District of
Delaware, and secondarily to jurisdictions with technology-intensive
industries.99
Patent law has a storied and controversial reputation for being
exceptional,100 a byproduct of its underlying technical complexity. Yet a
reform of patent venue along the lines discussed above, and irrespective

ets/morning-tech/2016/05/zuckerberg-facebook-wants-to-meet-with-conservatives-grassl
ey-open-to-house-ecpa-reform-bill-comment-backlog-at-the-fcc-214288)(last visited Mar.
3, 2017).
96
See e.g., Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
24, 2006); Daniel Nazer & Vera Ranieri, Why Do Patent Trolls Go to Texas? It’s Not for
the BBQ, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jul. 9, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplink
s/2014/07/why-do-patent-trolls-go-texas-its-not-bbq; Last Week Tonight with John Oliver:
Patents (HBO television broadcast Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3b
xcc3SM_KA.
97
VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
98
See supra, note 78-89 and accompanying text.
99
See supra, note 83-89 and accompanying text.
100
See Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413,
1415 (2016) (noting that “[a]lthough tensions between universality and exceptionalism
apply throughout law, they are particularly relevant to patent law”); see also James Donald
Smith, Patent Exceptionalism with Presidential Advice and Consent, 65 DUKE L.J. 1551
(2016) (stating that the Federal Circuit—in itself an example of an exceptional entity in the
configuration of the United States judicial system—is often singled out as the ultimate
embodiment of patent exceptionalism, not only because of its stand-alone institutional
design, but also (and primarily so) because of its procedural decisions on patent appeals).
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of its agent, would result in de facto unexceptional behavior through
restrictive application of a special patent procedural provision. Aberrant
forum shopping, as embodied by the current patent litigation cluster in the
Eastern District of Texas, would greatly diminish. Patent forum shopping
would fall to levels that match forum shopping in other areas of the law,
with the unsurprising resurgence of the District of Delaware—a district
that has historically been a stalwart of different types of corporate
litigation. In sum, treating patent venue specially would potentially
contribute to normalize patentee forum shopping, eradicating some of the
most outrageous side effects of the permissive approach to venue that has
marked the past 27 years.101
Patent law as a whole—or even the subset of procedural patent law—
will not become more or less exceptional because of the Supreme Court
decision in TC Heartland v. Kraft. But whether reform comes via the
Supreme Court or a different channel, patent venue per se is likely to
become less aberrant and, in this sense, will produce considerably fewer
extreme and exceptional results.

IV. CONCLUSION
For nearly three decades, patent venue was interpreted through a
connected reading of the special patent venue statute and the general venue
statute. This led to a permissive delineation of venue in patent
infringement lawsuits, which in turn generated extreme forms of patentee
forum shopping, as well as detrimental court competition for patent
litigation.
In TC Heartland v. Kraft, the Supreme Court has a chance, and is
expected, to overturn the Federal Circuit’s approach to venue. If the Court
sides with Heartland, plaintiffs will have a more limited choice of fora in
patent infringement lawsuits and patent litigation will see a redistribution
across districts. The Eastern District of Texas will lose much of its patent
caseload, which will migrate to the District of Delaware as well as districts
in areas with significant technology hubs.
Even if the Supreme Court upholds the Federal Circuit’s position,
there is still room for (and some momentum behind) patent reform through
legislative action. When reform does occur, venue in patent lawsuits will
begin to realign with trends in other fields. Reform will not eradicate
The most well-known of these being perhaps the construction of an ice rink by
Samsung in front of the Marshall, Texas courthouse, where Samsung has repeatedly been
sued for patent infringement, in attempt to maintain a positive image of the company
among potential jurors. See Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Patents (HBO television
broadcast Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bxcc3SM_KA at 8:08.
101

44

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:29

forum shopping, however, but it will prevent exceptional forms of forum
shopping like the ones that led to the rise of the Eastern District of Texas
as the premier patent district in the country.

